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ABSTRACT 
With the expansion of wireless sensor networks, the need for securing the data flow through these 
networks is increasing. These sensor networks allow for easy-to-apply and flexible installations which 
have enabled them to be used for numerous applications. Due to these properties, they face distinct 
information security threats. Security of the data flowing through across networks provides the 
researchers with an interesting and intriguing potential for research. Design of these networks to 
ensure the protection of data faces the constraints of limited power and processing resources. We 
provide the basics of wireless sensor network security to help the researchers and engineers in better 
understanding of this applications field. In this chapter, we will provide the basics of information 
security with special emphasis on WSNs. The chapter will also give an overview of the information 
security requirements in these networks. Threats to the security of data in WSNs and some of their 
counter measures are also presented.  
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) attract the attention of researchers and engineers thanks to their 
vast application scope. These allow for easy and flexible installation of wireless networks composed 
of large number of nodes. This gives WSN the capability to be used in unimaginable applications. 
They are finding their usages in habitat monitoring, manufacturing and logistics, environmental 
observation and forecast systems, military applications, health, home and office applications and a 
variety of intelligent and smart systems. Multimedia wireless sensor networking is a relatively new 
branch in this domain, which can process multimedia content i.e. still images, audio and video to 
name a few.  
Such a sensor network is typically composed of hundreds, and sometimes thousands of nodes. These 
nodes are capable of receiving, processing and transmitting information, as based on the assigned 
tasks. Information flowing through WSN may be susceptible to eavesdropping, retransmit previous 
packets, injection of redundant or causeless bits in packets and many other threats of diverse nature. 
To ensure that the data being received and transmitted across these networks is secure and protected, 
information security plays a vital role.  
As contrary to the Moore’s law, there has been not much development in the hardware capacity and 
computational capabilities of the sensors being deployed in wireless sensor networks. These networks 
are kept inexpensive, thus introducing many constraints in the performance parameters. Low cost 
sensors incorporate shortcomings in their storage capacity, power requirements and processing speed. 
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This poses a unique dilemma for researchers as they have to design efficient and distinct information 
security schemes which work seamlessly with the resource constrained sensor networks. 
Sensors in the network are mostly exposed to open environment as they have to interact with either 
other sensors or human beings. Physical security of these sensors is always vulnerable and thus poses 
an unprecedented threat to the overall security of the network. Advances in power analysis and time 
based attacks enable the malicious entities to perform various hazardous activities. 
Wireless channels are still considered unreliable and the same is the case with wireless sensor 
networks, which may contain a very large number of nodes and sinks, thus giving rise to concerns 
about the validity of the communications in the network. Trust models for the nodes have to be 
developed to make sure that all the nodes taking part in the communications are trustworthy.  
All these unique features of wireless sensor networks changes the way we look at their security. These 
networks face different kinds of threats from those of computer, wired, network or even the high-
bandwidth wireless models. Thus, these intimidations are coped in distinctive manners. 
This chapter will be beneficial in equipping the readers with the basic concepts of security and WSN 
security. Readers will be able to realize the strengths and weaknesses of WSN with respect to security. 
Some of the famous and latest attacks and their countermeasures will help in better understanding of 
the threats and our capabilities to cope with them. Readers with lesser or no prior knowledge of 
information security will be able to understand this chapter, because basic concepts needed for better 
apprehension of security issues will be defined. 
We are hopeful that the basics provided in this chapter will help the readers to grasp the fundamental 
concepts of Wireless Sensor Network Security (WSNS), which will empower them to embark on their 
journey to further explore this ever-expanding field and to find new problems and their solutions in 
this interesting research and applications field. 
General characteristics of WSN are presents in Section 2 of the chapter. These are the properties of 
these networks which make them the preferred solution in many applications, though they also present 
limitations on the viable solutions to the security issues in WSN. These attributes are studied with an 
emphasis on their importance in the security of WSN. 
For reliable and secure communications in WSNs, there are some security qualifications that must be 
fulfilled. These security requirements are given in Section 3.  
Threats in WSN are of diverse natures and kinds. Some of the important threats will be discussed in 
section 4 of this chapter. Countermeasures to some of the described attacks are presented in section 5. 
With growing research work in this field, there are many new results that are benefiting us in making 
the WSN more resistant to attacks and more efficient in their secure implementations in terms of 
power and memory. Some of the latest research work and implementations of schemes and algorithms 
are provided in section 6. 
Section 7, the last part of the chapter, concludes our discussion. It provides us with summary of the 
chapter and also outlines the research domains that can be pursued in the coming future related to 
WSN. 
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WSN 
Wireless sensor networks are unique in many of their features, which are discussed briefly here. These 
characteristics make them an attractive choice for many applications, and also present the researchers 
with distinct security challenges. 
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Fig. 1. Sensor node components 
2.1 Compact Size 
As discussed earlier, sensor network may contain hundreds or probably thousand of autonomous 
nodes. For such a huge network, size does matter. Sensors are kept small, which also limits the 
components on the main chip-board of the sensor and only the most crucial parts are installed on it. 
Small sizes of sensors may be considered as a positive attribute, as sensors can be deployed so that 
they are not visible.  
2.2 Physical Security 
Sensors usually get information about the environment and perform their designated operations. They 
have to interact with exposed surroundings which pose hazards to the physical protection of the 
sensors.  
2.3 Power 
Sensors in WSN contain non-renewable power resources thus causing an energy starved wireless 
network. Sensors cannot be recharged because of the volume and distribution of the network, which 
makes recharging of the nodes a laborious and expensive task. Power limitations in WSN are 
considered the major constraint to the performance of the network. As all the nodes do local 
processing, they are always in need of power. Thus, the inclusion of security features like encryption, 
decryption, authentication etc comes at the price of decrease in the overall performance of the nodes 
because of the energy consumed during these cryptographic algorithms and schemes.    
Security is vital for WSN, so there is always some compromise to make between the secure 
communication and allocation of energy resources for implementing cryptographic schemes. 
2.3 Memory Space 
Sensors have small memory space, which accounts for its low cost and power consumption. Memory 
is a precious asset for any sensor, thus keeping the size of the security algorithm source code small. 
Sizes of the keys that need to be stored are also kept at a minimum length because of scarcity of 
memory storage. Following table lists some of known sensor nodes and their memory spaces. 
Table 1. Sensor nodes and their memory spaces 
Sensor Node Microcontroller Program and data 
memory 
External memory 
IMote 2.0 Marvell PXA271 32 MB SRAM 32 MB Flash 
Mica2 ATMEGA 128L 4K RAM 128k Flash 
TelosB TI MSP430 10k RAM 48k Flash 
Ubimote2 TI's MSP430F2618 8k RAM 116k Flash 
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2.4 Bandwidth 
WSN is a low bandwidth network and as compared to other wireless networks, the quantity of data 
transmitted and received by the nodes is very low. This helps the nodes in saving the crucial power for 
other functions. As an estimate, each bit transmitted consumes as much power as executing 800-1000 
instructions. This is one of the reasons why cryptographic schemes with large key sizes (i.e. public 
key cryptography) are not preferred for these sensor networks.   
2.5 Unreliable Communications         
Like all other wireless communications, channels in the WSN are subject to unpredictable 
environmental conditions, state of channels, interference and many other factors that usually 
deteriorate the quality of service of the wireless links and induce errors in the information being 
transmitted.  
Error correcting codes, MAC and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) are sometimes used to cope with 
these problems. They are widely being used in wireless links to ensure better service at the expense of 
extra bits added to the original messages.    
 
3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN WSN 
WSN is a wireless network composed of sensors. Due to the attributes of being a network and 
utilizing wireless communications, the security demands for WSN are unique. Security requirements 
in WSN to ensure trustworthy and secure connections and communications are a combination of the 
specifications for computer network and wireless communication security. WSN has its own distinct 
features, as discussed in section 3, which make these networks unique. Their anomalous character is 
due to their large volume, pattern of distribution and resource restrictions. All these aspects give rise 
to some particular security necessities. We will discuss some of basic security specifications for WSN. 
3.1 Data Confidentiality 
Data is communicated between the sender and the recipient, sometimes being routed through many 
nodes. This data may also be kept in memory for further processing. This data can be sensitive enough 
to be known only by the sender and the recipient. Sometimes, the adversary can access this 
information by eavesdropping between wireless links, gaining admission to the storage or by other 
attacks. Data confidentiality means that the data can only be accessed, and thus utilized, by only those 
entities that are authorized for this purpose.  
If any data is lost by negligence and weak security measures, it can lead to identity thefts, loss in 
business, privacy breaching and many other malicious activities. This makes data or message 
confidentiality the most important feature of any security protocol. 
In WSN, data confidentiality can be observed by making sure that 
i) Sensor network should not leak any data to other networks in vicinity, thus retaining the message 
completely within the network. 
ii) Data is sometimes routed through many nodes before reaching the destination node. This causes a 
rise in need for secure communication channels between different nodes and also between nodes and 
base stations.  
iii) Encryption is one of the most commonly used procedures to provide confidentiality of data. 
Critical information such as keys and user identities should be encrypted before transmission. 
Sensitive information can be characterized from the kind and type of protocol being used i.e. 
symmetric or asymmetric cryptography, mutual authentication, identity or nonce based encryption.  
iv) Steps can also be taken towards encrypting the sensitive data before storing them in memory. This 
is particularly important if the nodes are exposed to user interaction, or in military applications.  
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Mostly symmetric cryptography or stream ciphers are used for encryption and decryption in WSN, 
due to the high storage and computational costs associated with the public key cryptography. TinySec 
is a link layer security protocol that makes use of RC5 and Skipjack block ciphers in cipher block 
chaining (CBC) mode of operation. LLSP uses AES in CBC mode. LiSP utilizes stream cipher for 
providing encryption.   
3.2 Data Integrity 
Provision of data confidentiality stops the leakage of data, but it is not helpful against insertion of data 
in the original message by adversary. Integrity of data needs to be assured in sensor networks, which 
solidifies that the received data has not been altered or tampered with and that new data has not been 
added to the original contents of the packet. Environmental conditions and channel’s quality of service 
can also change the primitive message.  
Data integrity can be provided by Message Authentication Code (MAC). For this purpose, both sender 
and receiver share a secret key. Sender computes the MAC using this key and contents of message, 
and transmits the message along with the MAC to the receiver. The recipient re-calculates MAC by 
using the shared secret key and message. Absence of irregularity in composition of calculated MAC 
establishes integrity in the received message. 
3.3 Data Authentication 
Authentication is used in sensor networks to block or restrict the activities of the unauthorized nodes. 
Any disapproved agent can inject redundant information, or temper with the default packets carrying 
information. It is particularly important in case of decision making chunks of information. Nodes 
receiving the packets must make sure that the originator of packets is an accredited source. Nodes 
taking part in the communication must be capable of recognizing and rejecting the information from 
illegitimate nodes.  
Although data or message authentication can be provided by incorporating calculation of MAC, this 
symmetric procedure is not recommended for multi-party communication.  
Symmetric schemes normally use the calculation of MAC at the sender and receiver ends. It is usually 
done by the same technique as describes in 3.2 (previous part).  
Multi-party communications or broadcasting makes use of asymmetric authentication schemes. Data 
authentication in broadcasting requires strong trust assumptions, thus giving rise to different 
categories of trust. For authentication purposes, both of the mutual authentication and one-way 
authentication method can be used based on trust requirements.  
In SPINS [20], authors state that if a sender wants to send authentic data to mutually untrusted 
receivers, symmetric MAC is not secure since any one of the receivers already knows the MAC key 
and hence could impersonate itself as the original sender of the message. Then it can forge fake 
messages and send them to other receivers. SPINS constructs authenticated broadcast from symmetric 
primitives but it establishes asymmetry by the utilization of delayed key disclosure and one-way 
function key chains. 
LEAP [8], on the other hand uses a globally shared symmetric key for broadcast messages to the 
whole group. As the group key is shared among all the nodes in the network, steps are taken to update 
this key through rekeying mechanism if any node is compromised. LEAP exercises an efficient 
approach to get information about any compromised node.  
3.4 Data Freshness 
Some of the messages are critical enough that extra precautions need to be taken to ensure their 
correction. Confidentiality and Authentication may not be useful when any old message is replayed by 
any attacker. Data freshness implies that the received messages are recent, and previous messages are 
not being replayed. Importance of data freshness becomes evident in networks using shared key 
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operations. During the time taken for transmission of shared key in WSN, replay attack can be carried 
out by adversary.  
Data freshness is categorized into two types based on the message ordering; weak and strong 
freshness. Weak freshness provides only partial message ordering but gives no information related to 
the delay and latency of the message. Strong freshness, on the other hand gives complete request-
response order and the delay estimation. Sensor measurements require weak freshness, while strong 
freshness is useful for time synchronization within the network.      
To accommodate data freshness, nonce which is a randomly generated number or a time dependent 
counter can be appended to the data. Messages with previous nonce and old counter numbers are 
rejected. This guarantees acceptance of only recent data, and thus the freshness in data is achieved.  
3.5 Availability 
Introduction of security scheme in WSN comes at the expense of computational storage and energy 
costs. Security features in the network may be considered as extra feature by some because of the 
restrictions it can impose on the availability of the data. Insertion of security can cause earlier 
depletion of energy and storage resources, causing unavailability of data. Similarly, if security of any 
one node (especially in central point network management) is compromised or any Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack is launched, data becomes inaccessible.  
Availability of data becomes an important security requirement because of the mentioned arguments. 
Security protocol should consume less energy and storage, which can be achieved by the reuse of 
code and making sure that there is minimum increase in communication due to the functioning of 
security protocols. 
Processing within the networking and en-route filtering can be used to subsidize the effects of 
malicious attacks and other issues that may arise because of increase in communication due to 
utilization of security scheme. There is also a need to avoid central management scheme in sensor 
networks as they can affect the availability of data due to single point failures. These steps will also 
make the network robust against attacks.   
3.6 Self-organization in WSN 
As mentioned in previous sections, one of the characteristics of WSN is their composition and 
distribution. A typical WSN may have hundreds of nodes performing different operations, installed at 
various locations. Ad-hoc networks are also sensor networks, having the same flexibility and 
extensibility. These otherwise attractive properties of WSN pose a serious threat to the overall security 
situation of the network, raising the importance of a self-organized and robust structure of network.  
For using public key cryptography based scheme, an efficient design is needed that takes into account 
all the situations for sharing the key and is capable of trust management amongst different nodes. 
Keys can be redistributed between the nodes and base stations to provide key management. Schemes 
can use symmetric cryptography that applies key predistribution methods.  
3.7 Secure Localization 
WSN makes use of geographical based information for identification of nodes, or for accessing 
whether the sensors belong to the network or not. Some attacks work by analyzing the location of the 
nodes. Adversary may probe the headers of the packets and protocol layer data for this purpose. This 
makes the secure localization an important feature that must be catered during our implementation of 
security protocol.  
 
 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks and Energy Efficiency: Protocols, Routing and Management 
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-0101-7.ch024 
4. ATTACKS ON WSN 
Wireless sensor networks are power constraint networks, having limited computational and energy 
resources. This makes them vulnerable enough to be attacked by any adversary deploying more 
resources than any individual node or base station, which may not be a tedious task for the attacker. 
As described earlier, a typical sensor network may be composed of potentially hundreds of nodes 
which may use broadcast or multicast transmission. This mode of transmission results in a large 
volume wireless network with many potential receivers of the transmitted information. This makes a 
number of attacks such as packet alteration or new packet insertion, capturing of node, reply attacks, 
denial of service and traffic analysis possible to be performed on any sensor network. 
WSN can be cooperatively attacked by colluding in which the adversary makes use of illegitimate 
nodes with the same capabilities as of network nodes. Deployed malicious nodes can work together to 
take control of any network node, which can be used further to make damages to the network or to 
amplify the scope of the attack.  
The opponent may have highly capable communication links available to carry out any malicious 
activity, thus making the countermeasure an expensive task. This is a limitation to the security of 
WSN as we constantly need inexpensive and small devices as nodes in sensor networks. 
Deployment of many nodes of WSN in open and harsh environment poses them another major threat. 
This compromises their physical security, and if the nodes are not temper-resistant, they can be 
mishandled and tempered with. Attacks on the physical security of the nodes can cause the node to 
give away the data stored on it, which may enable the attacker to gain access to critical information 
such as source code, key and other data which may be crucial for security protocol of the entire 
wireless network. Making these nodes temper resistant may be able to reduce the effects of side-
channel attacks and to enhance the physical security of the network devices, but this may not be the 
feasible solution as the cost per node increases dramatically if we consider such defenses.  
WSN are continuously being used in many critical and sensitive applications. WSN are popular 
thanks to their ability to incorporate in numerous applications in diverse fields. Health care, security, 
logistics and military applications are some of the areas of deployment of these wireless networks. It 
is evident that if the capabilities or functionalities of the sensor network are reduced or endangered, it 
may cause huge losses in terms of money, resources and may even result in human injuries or 
fatalities.   
This section contains basics of some attacks on WSN, and effects of these attacks on the performance 
of the wireless networks. 
Threat Models 
An attacker may have access only to a few nodes which he or she has compromised. Such attacker is 
classified as mote class attacker. Alternatively an attacker may have access to more powerful devices 
such as laptops, hence the definition laptop class attacker. Such attackers have powerful CPUs, great 
battery power, high power radio transmitter and sensitive antennas at their disposal and pose a much 
larger threat to the network. For example a few nodes can jam a few radio links where as a laptop can 
jam the entire network. 
Finally, attacks launched on a network may be insider or outsider attacks. In outsider attacks the 
attacker has no special access to the network. In insider attacks however, the attacker is considered to 
be an authorized participant of the network. 
Such attacks are either launched from compromised sensor nodes running malicious code or laptops 
using stolen data (cryptographic keys & code) from legitimate nodes. 
Now some of the major attacks on WSN are presented. Jamming and physical attacks affect the 
physical layer of the WSN structure. Collision, exhaustion and unfairness attack types belong to the 
attacks on data link layer of the WSN.  
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4.1 Denial of Service (DoS) 
Jamming nodes of networks, sending continuous messaging without following the system 
communication protocol (link layer protocols) by any node, malicious attacks and environmental 
condition may cause resource exhaustion and failures of devices in the WSN. This causes degraded 
system performance and it is not able to function as expected. These are the forms of Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks that intend to affect the functionality of WSN.  
These attacks are carried out on the physical, link, routing and transport layers of the WSN 
architecture. Because of resource limitations of WSN, guarding against these attacks become very 
costly. Researchers put lot of effort to study these attacks and to devise the methods to minimize their 
impact on the network.  
Now we briefly discuss some of the major types of DoS attacks according to the layers whom they 
affect. Jamming and physical attacks affect the physical layer of WSNs. Neglect and greed, homing, 
routing information alteration or spoofing, black holes and flooding belong to the type of attacks on 
network layer of the WSN architecture.    
 4.1.1 Jamming 
Nodes in WSN utilize radio frequencies for the transmission of information, as these sensor networks 
use wireless channels for communications. Jamming is one of the basic yet detrimental attacks that 
intend to intervene in physical layer of the WSN structure. It is simply the transmission of the radio 
signals having the same frequencies as being used by the wireless network.  
Jamming causes permanent or temporary suspension of message reception and transmission from the 
jammed node devices. WSN is widely distributed wireless network, which makes complete jamming 
an unfeasible attempt. Still jamming of a few nodes in WSN can lead to deterioration in effectiveness 
of many neighboring nodes.   
4.1.2 Physical Attacks 
As mentioned earlier, WSN devices may be deployed in vast geographical areas and in hostile and 
harsh environments. Moreover sensor nodes are kept cheap and light weight, which limits any effort 
to make them temper-proof, their ability to withstand harsh climate or conditions and to avoid or 
regulate any physical or more sophisticated side-channel attacks.  
This makes the WSN nodes highly prone to any physical tempering or other attacks performed on its 
construction. Nodes can be modified to extract key and other important cryptographic parameters that 
are crucial for working of any security protocol. Similarly adversary can extract source code which 
eventually provides attacker the information about the network, which can modify the code to get 
access into the network. Attacker can replace the nodes with the illegitimate and malicious ones, thus 
compromising the operation of the whole sensor network. 
Physical attacks gives the attacker the ability to alter the nodes and thus the network functioning. 
These attacks are hard to avoid due to the major characteristics of any WSN to be inexpensive and 
disperse. 
4.2 Collisions 
Collision is a type of link layer jamming, in which the efficiency of the network is reduced by using 
the fact that continuous transmission of messages can cause collisions in networks. Collisions cause 
retransmission of the collided messages and if it happens often then the energy resource of a node can 
be depleted. Another form of this attack can happen when some part packet is altered, which causes 
MAC mismatch at the receiver. The corrupted packets are transmitted again, increasing the energy and 
time cost for transmission. Such an attack when prolonged impels the decrease of network fruition. 
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4.3 Exhaustion 
This attack drains the power resources of the nodes by causing them to retransmit the message even 
when there is no collision or late collision. A node can seek access to any channel deliberately and 
perpetually, forcing the neighboring nodes to respond continuously.  
4.4 Unfairness 
MAC protocols govern the communications in networks by forcing priority schemes for seamless 
correspondence. It is possible to exploit these protocols thus affecting the precedence schemes, which 
eventually results in decrease in service. 
4.5 Neglect and Greed Attack 
During communication between any two nodes in WSN, there may be need to route and re-route 
packets through many nodes. Transmission from source to destination depends on complete and 
successful routing of the destined packets. Malicious or compromised node in the way can influence 
multi-hopping in the network, either by dropping some of packets or by routing the packets towards a 
false node. This attack also disturbs the functioning of the neighboring nodes, which may not be able 
to receive or transmit messages.  
4.6 Homing 
Cluster head nodes or the base station neighboring nodes are the most important nodes in WSN. In 
homing attack, the adversary analysis the network traffic to judge the geographic location of cluster 
heads or base station neighboring nodes. It can then perform some other kind of attacks on these 
critical nodes, so as to physically disable them or to capture them which in turn can lead to major 
damages to the network.   
4.7 Routing Information Alteration (spoofing) 
In this attack, routing information is altered and tempered with. This can create new routing paths, or 
lengthen or shorten existing routing paths thus increasing the end-to-end latency. It repels or attracts 
traffic decreasing the quality of service. It can also generate false error messages which disable or 
increase latency for nodes to access the channel.  
4.8 Black holes 
In WSN, it is possible that nodes are not fully aware with the complete topology of the network 
because of the large volume of the network. If distance-vector-based protocols are used in these 
sensor networks, they are highly susceptible to the formation of black holes. Malicious nodes can 
advertise zero-cost routes to other nodes in the networks, which causes more traffic to flow toward 
these nodes. Malicious node’s neighboring nodes compete for unlimited bandwidth, thus causing 
resource contention and message disruption. If this state continues, the neighboring nodes may as well 
exhaust causing a hole in the network. These attacks are also known as “sink hole” attacks. 
4.9 Flooding 
An attacker continuously sends connection establishment requests to a node in this type of resource 
exhaustion attack. Each of such requests makes the node allocate some resources to serve each request. 
Persist requests by a malicious node may drain the memory and energy resources of the node under 
attack. 
4.10 De-synchronization    
In this attack, an adversary can fabricate messages containing any control flags or sequence numbers 
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of previous frames, and transmit them to two connected nodes. These fake messages make the nodes 
realize as if they have lost their synchronization. Nodes retransmit the assumed missed frames, and if 
the adversary is capable of persistent transmission of forged messages then the resources of the nodes 
will be soon depleted. Moreover the connected nodes are not able to share any useful information 
during this attack, as they delve infinitely in synchronization-recovery protocols.  
4.11 Interrogation 
An interrogation attack exploits the two-way request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) handshake that 
many MAC protocols use to mitigate the hidden-node problem. An attacker can exhaust a node’s 
resources by repeatedly sending RTS messages to elicit CTS responses from a targeted neighbor node. 
4.12 Sybil Attack 
In this interesting attack, a node can take multiple identities which lead to the failure of the 
redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks. Sybil attack 
functions by its property of representing multiple nodes simultaneously. The Sybil attack is capable of 
damaging other fault tolerant schemes such as dispersity, multi path routing, routing algorithms, data 
aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation and topology maintenance. This attack also affects the 
geographical routing protocols, where the malicious node presents several identities to other nodes in 
the network and thus appears to be in more than one location at a time. Similarly, during the voting 
process the malicious node can create additional votes thanks to its ability to present several identities 
at a time. It can strike the routing algorithms by defining many routes through only one node. 
Resources of a node can be drained by requests from multiple entities which are in fact exhibited by a 
single malicious node. 
4.13 Selective Forwarding 
A node may drop partial or complete packets hopping through it, thus disturbing the quality of service 
in WSN. If all packets are dropped, the neighboring nodes become suspicious and may consider it to 
be malfunctioning thus finding new routes. Malicious node can selectively forward data to avoid 
suspicion. It can drop some of the data and passes all other to prevent issues that may arise concerning 
its performance. Malicious nodes may only allow the data transfer from some selective nodes, giving 
them the space to alter or suppress data from particular nodes. 
This kind of attacks becomes very difficult to detect. 
4.14 Worm holes 
Worm holes are formed by malicious nodes working in different parts of the network. In this attack, 
the attacker receives messages in one section of network over a low-latency link and sends them to 
another section of the network. These messages are then replayed in the other part of the network thus 
forming a worm hole in the present structure of the information flow in network. The impression can 
be detrimental if the adversary finds its presence near the base stations, giving the distant nodes the 
realization that they are in the vicinity of the base stations. Multi-hop nodes get the notion through 
wormholes that they are only one or two nodes away from the base station. Traffic flows to the low-
latency route that the adversary provides to these distant nodes. This may cause congestion and further 
retransmissions of the packets by the legitimate nodes, dissipating their energy. 
This attack when used in conjunction with Sybil and selective forwarding attacks becomes difficult to 
distinguish and evade. 
4.15 Hello Flood Attacks 
At the start of communication, node has to announce itself to the network by broadcasting hello 
message to their neighboring nodes. It also validates that the node sending hello message is in the 
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vicinity. Adversary can exploit this feature by using a high-powered wireless link. It can assure every 
node in the network that he is their neighbor, thus starting communication with nodes. As obvious, by 
using this attack security of the information is compromised as the attacker gains access to the 
information flow in the network. If some puzzle scheme is used by the nodes to provide access to any 
node requesting for connection, then a variant of this attack can also be applied.  
Adversary should possess enough resources to manage this attack, and should be able to provide high 
quality routing path to other nodes in network. Traffic will find this path attractive enough to send 
packets through it, creating data congestion and disturbing the hierarchy of the data flow in network. 
4.16 Acknowledgement Spoofing 
Acknowledgments play a vital role in determining the quality of service at any links and establishing 
further connections based on the this information. Adversary can alter acknowledgements to present 
to any transmitting node that any weak link is strong enough for reliable communication. 
The packets that are sent on this link are partially or completely dropped, thus decreasing the overall 
attainment of the WSN. 
4.17 Node Replication Attack 
Sensor nodes have IDs as their identity (and indices of their location in geographical routing 
algorithms) in the WSN. An adversary can add new node to the sensor network by copying the ID of 
an already existing node and assigning it to the malicious node. This ensures presence of the 
adversary in the network allowing the malicious entity to induce destructive affects to the sensor 
network.  
By using the replicated node, packets arriving through it can be dropped, misrouted or altered. This 
results in incorrect contents of information packet, loss of connection, data loss and high end-to-end 
latency. Adversary can gain access to the critical information (cryptographic key, source code or other 
security parameters) by practicing this attack, which brings about security implication of the whole 
sensor network. 
Replicated nodes at specific location can be used to carry out coordinated attack to influence 
particular nodes or sections of the network.  
 
5. COUNTERMEASURES TO ATTACKS ON WSN 
5.1 Denial of Services (DoS) 
5.1.1 Jamming 
Jamming and its countermeasures depend on the resources of both the sensor nodes and that of the 
device used by attacker. One of the most obvious solutions to avoid jamming is spread spectrum, or 
code spreading as used in mobile communication. In these methods, several frequencies are utilized 
for transmission. Both of these spreading techniques are affective against jamming, as the simple 
jammer is usually not capable to jam wide band of frequencies or switch to the exact frequencies as 
being used in frequency hopping or spread spectrum. Implementing these procedures in hardware 
requires more space, and increases the overall complexity and cost of the device. Sensor devices are 
kept inexpensive and compact in size, which limits the prospect of deploying these methods in 
practice.  
Jamming attacks can be characterized by high background noises which can be detected and reported 
by the neighboring nodes. If the jammed part of the WSN is identified, then a deviation in routing 
paths can help in avoiding this attack.  
If jamming attack is found by the network, the sensor nodes under attack can be put to sleep for a long 
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time. Low duty cycle can be applied to consume less power. This enables the nodes to conserve their 
already limited energy resources, which gives them opportunity to try to connect to WSN once the 
attack is over. Attacked sensor node can also send a high power message reporting the attack to 
neighboring nodes or base stations during the attack, if the attacker employs stuttering or interruptive 
jamming.  Another efficient yet costly solution is the alternative use of optical or infra-red 
communications for sensor devices under jamming attack, but these modes are distance restricted and 
quite expensive.  
5.1.2 Physical Attacks 
Adversary can exploit physical weakness of motes to access crucial data stored on it, and is also 
capable of damaging or replicating the nodes. Steps that one must to ensure the physical safety of 
sensor nodes in WSN are based on the desired level of security. One cannot fully guarantee complete 
protection of hundreds or thousands of nodes, which are typically dispersed over large distance to 
form WSNs.  
Nodes in hostile environments can be made temper-proof so that security of these motes is not 
compromised over cost. Camouflaging and hiding sensor nodes are other countermeasures against 
physical attacks.  
Motes which handle critical data can use any erasure procedure which makes them remove any 
critical information i.e. cryptographic keys or codes, when they are tempered with.  
5.2 Collisions 
Altered packets of information can increase latency in networks, and results in dropping and 
discarding of packets once they are found corrupt thus degrading the service of the network. Collision 
detection and avoidance schemes can be employed to avert such situations. Cyclic redundancy check 
(CRC) of the messages can be computed on the transmitter and receiver ends to ascertain the integrity 
of the message. Similarly, error correcting codes can also be used for avoiding and corruption by 
outsider to the messages. Such codes, with high error correcting capabilities, come at the expense of 
extra bits that must be appended with the original message. This poses a limitation to the effectiveness 
of these codes as the malicious agents may be able to inject more errors in the message than the 
capabilities of the correcting codes. Cooperation between the communicating nodes can also avoid the 
corruption of the transmitted packets.       
5.3 Exhaustion 
Exhaustion of the power of the sensor due to retransmissions even though they are caused by late 
collisions, can be handled by use of time division multiplexing (TDM). TDM provides each sensor 
with a time slot to send its data which avoids collisions. This solves the infinite deference problem, 
which is caused by continuous retransmissions by nodes. 
Allowing limited number of requests to access network at a time can also help in getting rid of 
collisions. Such a limitation is implemented by exercise of MAC admission control rate, which allows 
only specific number of requests to access the network. 
5.4 Unfairness  
Adversary exploits the cooperative MAC priority scheme by making sensors to miss their 
transmission deadlines. This attack affects the real-time users to a large extent. Use of small packets 
avoids this attack as each sensor node seizes the channel only for short time.  
5.5 Neglect and Greed Attack  
Due to partial drop of packets and unpredictable behavior of malicious node in this attack, it is not 
possible to detect this type of attack. The best step to avoid damage by neglect or greed of malicious 
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sensor node is to define alternative routing paths. Another proposed solution is to use redundant 
messages that reduce the impairment by malicious node.  
5.6 Homing 
Adversary learns about the important nodes by analyzing the headers and contents of the messages 
flowing in the network. Encrypting the header and contents of message makes the task of adversary 
more difficult. Source and destination of the intercepted messages becomes discreet by using 
cryptography.  
5.7 Routing Information Alteration (spoofing) 
Routing information included in the packets are altered or spoofed to divert the flow of traffic to the 
intended destinations. Node addresses can be changed and adversary can control the flow of traffic, 
which makes it possible for it to attack any particular node. 
Packets construction can be made secure by using CRC or MAC schemes, which makes the detection 
of tempered packets easy. Similarly, link layer authentication also helps to avoid this attack. Only 
authorized nodes are allowed to take part in exchange of information. 
Similarly, interrogation attacks can be handled by the use of authentication and antireplay protection 
schemes.  
 5.8 Black holes 
To counter the formation of black holes, similar steps to that of routing alteration (also termed as 
“misdirection” in some texts) are taken as this attack also functions by changes in the routing 
information of the traffic.  
Requests for exchange of data should come only from authorized sensors, and an efficient 
authentication scheme must be deployed to ensure this. WSN can use public key cryptography to sign 
and verify the routing information and updates. Public key cryptography is quite costly and requires 
large overhead which makes its utilization for this purpose very difficult. Efficient certification and 
threshold based cryptography based schemes are advised to be used for authentication and trust 
management in WSN. 
Neighboring nodes can monitor the activities of the node, and can analyze its behavior by sending 
dummy packets and checking whether it reaches its destination. Geography based probing do not 
require all nodes in the network to participate in monitoring activities. Physical topology of the 
network is analyzed by sending probe to detect any black holes and damaged regions. 
5.9 Flooding 
Flooding cause the allocation of resources to the requesting clients and limits the effectiveness of 
already resource starved sensor node. One method to void this attack is to limit the number of 
connections. This method has disadvantage of restraining the approval of connection to legitimate 
nodes at times.  
Clients who wish to be connected can be presented puzzles to solve, to show their commitment. 
Adversary needs to allocate more resources to carry out this attack. Puzzle scheme takes more energy 
resources than usual of the sensors by it also makes the flooding attacks more studious for the attacker. 
Legal nodes need to put more resources to establish connection, which comes as a drawback of this 
procedure. 
5.10 De-synchronization    
Adversary forges the control fields and the transport layer header to cause retransmissions and 
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eventually lose of synchronization between communicating nodes. Authenticating the critical parts for 
transportation of the packets provides counter to this kind of assault on motes.   
The receiver end detects any fake messages and is able to ignore the instructions carried out by them.  
5.11 Sybil Attack 
Insider node cannot be prevented from launching this attack, but its activities can be restricted. In 
order to prevent an insider from communicating within the network and establishing shared keys with 
every node in the network, the base station limits the number of neighbors any sensor can establish 
connection with. If any node tries to exceed this limit, it results in occurrence of error. By using this 
scheme, a node when compromised, is limited to communication with only a limited number of nodes 
which tend to be in its vicinity.  
Moreover identities of the nodes which request to establish connections are verified. Each node shares 
its unique key with the base station. Neighboring nodes exchange information between themselves 
using the shared key to verify the communication. Compromised node is able to communicate only 
with its neighbors, thus restraining the affect of this attack. 
5.12 Selective Forwarding 
Like route alteration attack, the step to eradicate or avoid this attack is the use of multipath routing. 
This measure ensures that the destination finally gets the message sent towards it, through some 
disjoint path of that of malicious node.  
Regular monitoring of the network enables the WSN to track suspicious behavior by any node. Source 
routing that uses the geographical monitoring of the network can also be used as a prevention measure 
to this type of attack.  
Similar preventions and counter-measures can be applied to other attacks on WSN, as they are also 
variants of the described attacks. 
 
6. LATEST RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENTATIONS 
6.1 User Authentication 
Authentication is one of the foremost security features, and hence it finds its applications in WSN 
security at different levels. It may include authentication of client nodes to authorize the access to 
channel or exchange of information, Or it may be in form of signing and verifying messages so as to 
ensure that the contents of the received messages are intact, which saves network from many attacks. 
Now we will briefly mention some of the important works that have been done for authentication 
process for WSN.   
Jaing et al. [22] presents a distributed user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks. This 
scheme uses self-certified keys cryptosystem (SCK). They make use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) to establish pair-wise keys in their user authentication scheme. This user authentication scheme 
provides less computational and communication overhead.  
Taojun Wu et al. [23] propose a group-based peer authentication scheme for real-time sensor 
applications. Authenticity and integrity of messages received by base station are crucial in final 
tracking results. They designed a security component MultiMAC, which uses SkipJack 
implementation in TinySec as symmetric cipher. Each sensor node stores a different set of keys in its 
memory, pre-defined by a key mapping scheme. Multiple message authentication code (MAC)s of 
every message are calculated in SkipJack, using the key set assigned to the sensor node. The receiver 
authenticates the message by recalculating MACs using its shared keys, thus providing authenticity of 
received message. 
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Broadcast authentication limits the number of clients requesting to establish connection by giving 
access to authorized and trusted nodes, and thus proves to be an important security service. In WSN, 
digital signatures (sign and verify) and μTESLA-based methods provide broadcast authentication. 
Both of these techniques can be exploited by the adversary, which results in increase of cost for 
sensors. Signatures are too expensive to be applied for every connection request and packet 
forwarding can be used on μTESLA technique, thus making these two methods a weak choice. P. 
Ning et al. [24] suggests the use of message-specific puzzle scheme to ensure broadcast authentication, 
which proves to be much better in terms of cost and effectiveness. 
In [25], a scheme for cooperative distributed public key authentication scheme that does not require 
any cryptographic overhead is presented. Each node stores a few number of hashed keys for other 
nodes. When a public key authentication is needed, the nodes who store this key help in authenticating 
it in a distributed and cooperative manner.  
K. Han et al. [26] in their paper in “Sensors” propose an untraceable node authentication and key 
exchange protocol. The protocol adds light overhead which intends to increase the lifetime of the 
sensors. The protocol insures untracebility of the nodes, and works well in dynamic environments.  
 
6.2 Key Establishment 
Key establishment among nodes of sensor network is an important security aspect. Key establishment 
is needed for authentication and encryption processes, which are crucial for securing the network 
against many attacks. Key management maintains stability between sensor nodes in spite of their low 
operational efficiency.  
Key establishement is performed by using public key protocol like Diffie-Hellman (DH), Elliptic 
curve DH and by using El-Gamal public key scheme.  
Q. Huang et al. [27] presents an authenticated key establishment protocol between a sensor and a 
security manager in a self-organizing sensor network. This hybrid technique uses symmetric key 
operations instead of public key protocols to reduce the burden on the resource constrained nodes.  
In [28], authors propose efficient hybrid key establishment protocol for sensor network self-organized 
with equal distribution between sensor nodes. This protocol is applicable to distributed environment 
without control of base station. The scheme combines elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key establishment 
with implicated certificate and symmetric key encryption technology.  
Efficient implementations of cryptographic key establishment for WSNs pose a challenge to the 
limited capability nodes. A light weight implementation of elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key 
exchange for ZigBee-compliant sensor nodes is given in [29]. This implementation uses ATmega128 
processor running the TinyOS operating system and it perform 192 bit prime field elliptic curve 
cryptography.  
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Fig. 2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
 
6.3 Trust Management  
Trust between the cooperating entities is an important issue in any networked environment. Trust can 
solve some problems beyond the capability of traditional cryptographic security. It can be used to 
judge the quality of service being provided by any sensor, which can further help in deciding about 
provision of access control to that node. In simple networked systems, where security was not deemed 
necessary, it was assumed that all the parties participating in the communication in the network are 
trusted ones. But this is not applicable to modern network systems and same is true for wireless sensor 
networks. We need good trust model within the network to be able to establish connections, exchange 
keys and information.   
M. Momani et al. [30] presents a trust model based on the observed difference in monitoring events 
and reporting data. This model takes sensor reliability as a component of trust.  
H. Chen [31] proposes a task-based trust management framework for WSNs, in which nodes maintain 
reputation for other nodes of several different tasks and use it to evaluate their trustworthiness. The 
sensor node maintains a trust rating for different tasks while cooperating with other nodes. The node 
considers this trust rating to decide its priority to cooperative with nodes with different operations and 
tasks. A watchdog technique observes the behavior in different task of these nodes and broadcast their 
trust ratings. 
6.4 Implementations  
Implementations of different cryptographic protocols are widely discussed and researched, due to the 
difference in their strength, key sizes and application abilities. Some of the latest research in this 
regard is described here. 
R. Roman and C. Alcaraz [32] discusses the possibility of using public key infrastructure in wireless 
sensor networks, as earlier public key systems were considered too expensive. The authors state that 
this notion has been partially changed due to development of new hardware and software prototypes 
based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and other PKC primitives. They point out the possibility 
to incorporate public key infrastructure such as digital signatures, in the near future.     
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Hardware implementation of public key cryptosystems is given in [33]. The authors implement 1024-
bit RSA and 160-bit ECC public key cryptosystems on Berkeley Motes. They achieve execution times 
of 0.79 secs for RSA public key operation and 21.5 secs for private operation, and 1.3 secs for ECC 
signature generation and 2.8 secs for verification. They also implement ECC on Telos B motes with 
signature time 1.60 secs and a verification time of 3.30 secs.  
In ECC, scalar multiplication takes most of the execution time. It has been estimated that nearly 80% 
of the time is taken by scalar multiplication step. Authors in [34] suggest that there is a room to reduce 
the key calculation time to meet the potential applications, in particular for wireless sensor networks 
(WSN) by reducing the time needed for multiplications. They proposed that the positive integer in 
point multiplication may be re-coded with one’s complement subtraction to reduce the computational 
cost. 
A. Liu and P. Ning [35] present the design, implementation scheme, and evaluation of TinyECC, 
which is a configurable library for implementation of ECC in wireless sensor networks. TinyECC 
provides a readymade, publicly available software package for ECC-based public key structures. 
Different optimization steps are included in TinyECC giving the developers the capability to utilize it 
on different platforms efficiently.  
Author in [36] states that most of the public-key cryptographic implemented on small devices are in 
conjunction with special purpose cryptographic hardware. Accelerators for many crypto functions are 
used along with small processors. 
However in [37], authors implemented ECC without use of any special hardware. With the help of 
their new algorithm that reduces memory accesses, they achieved 160-bit ECC point multiplication on 
an Atmel ATmegal28 at 8MHz at 0.81 secs. This is the best known execution time for such an 
operation without using specialized cryptographic hardware. 
Software and hardware co-design of ECC {GF(2
191
)} is implemented in [16] using Dalton 8051 and 
special hardware. The hardware consists of an elliptic curve acceleration unit (ECAU) and an 
interface with direct memory access (DMA) to enable fast data transfer between the ECAU and the 
external RAM (XRAM) attached to the 8051 microcontroller. 
 
Fig. 3. System block diagram for Software/Hardware co-design of ECC 
The special hardware and software combination enables the authors to perform the full scalar 
multiplication over the field GF(2
191
) in about 118 msecs, assuming that the Dalton 8051 is clocked 
with frequency of 12 MHz. 
Author in [36] shows that ECC can be executed at 63.4 msecs, by using TMS54xx type digital signal 
processors (DSP). With the decrease in the prices of DSP chips and their compactness, it is safe to 
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think that these processors can be used in WSN sensors in near future.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter serves as a text for researchers especially the beginners, and enables them to get an 
overview of this ever increasing area of research, wireless sensor networks. This chapter gives a brief 
yet extensive insight into intriguing world of sensors. Chapter contains many topics of interest, and 
many more can be found by investigating more deep into this research field.    
Chapter has been divided into different sections, describing different aspects of WSN. Basic 
characteristics of WSN are discusses to give the readers an outline of WSN, which helps in 
understanding the attacks on WSN and their countermeasures. Some of the major attacks on WSN are 
given, along with their preventive and counter steps.  
The challenges to the field of WSN are unique, and so are their security designs. In time to come, we 
must be ready to accept many more unique designs of WSN, more sophisticated attacks and their 
preventions.  
 
Keywords: wireless sensor network, security, threats, attacks, countermeasures, 
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